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Situational crime prevention strategies (SCP) by law-abiding citizens and government officials 
have come to the forefront of criminological inquiry since Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity 
approach and Cornish & Clarke’s (1986) rational choice perspective were integrated under the 
theoretical umbrella known as the opportunity theories of crime (Felson & Clarke 1998). These 
theories share a common premise that the characteristics of a situation give rise to opportunities that 
cause crime; by blocking these opportunities, therefore, crime can be prevented (Eck 1998; Eck and 
Weisburd 1995; Felson & Clarke 1998; Welsh and Farrington 2009). 
SCP was designed to offer various techniques for blocking crime opportunities by 
manipulating the specific situational characteristics that help generate such opportunities (Clarke 1980; 
Welsh and Farrington 2009). These techniques range from hardening crime targets by using locks, 
burglar-proofing or alarms, to extending guardianship by increasing surveillance and supervision. 
These actions increase the effort for offenders to commit crime and increase their risks of being 
detected (Clarke 1997). According to situational crime prevention and opportunity theories, therefore, 
these preventive actions serve to reduce crime opportunities by manipulating situational characteristics 
so that the costs are higher than the benefits of committing the criminal act; the offender is 
consequently discouraged from committing the crime (Felson & Clarke 1998). 
In the criminal underworld, however, the function of situational prevention is more complex. 
Like non-criminals, offenders must guard themselves against victimization – including predation and 
retaliation by other offenders (Jacobs, 2000; Jacobs and Wright, 2006; Jacobs, Topalli and Wright, 
2000; Topalli, Wright, and Fornango, 2002; Wright and Decker, 1994, 1997). In addition, and unlike 
the law-abiding population, criminals must also guard against law enforcement. To guard against law 
enforcement such as arrest, prosecution, or imprisonment, criminals implement strategies to block 
opportunities for government officials to control and punish crime (Adler 1993; Cooney 1998, 2009; 
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Goffman 2009; Goffman 1969; Jacobs 1996, 2010; Johnson and Natarajan 1995; Weisburd et al. 
2006). 
This paper explores situational prevention of both victimization and law enforcement from the 
offenders’ perspective. It shows how offenders guard against victimization by employing situational 
crime prevention techniques, and will also illustrate how offenders use similar strategies to guard 
against law enforcement by police or other types of formal control. This contributes to criminology by 
building our understanding of crime prevention through an investigation of how offenders protect 
themselves and their property from victimization during risky criminal activities, while simultaneously 
increasing our knowledge of strategies that offenders use to evade law enforcement officials.  
We begin with a review of the work in the traditions of situational crime prevention (Clarke 
1980, 1997, 2008) and the offenders’ perspective on crime (Sutherland 1937; Wright and Decker 1994, 
1997), which provide us the groundwork for suggesting the offenders’ perspective on situational 
prevention. We will then go on to describe the method and data employed in this paper, namely 
qualitative descriptions from middle- and lower-class drug dealers. These data will be used to illustrate 
various categories of situational techniques that protect against victimization and formal control. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for understanding crime and crime prevention.  
 
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION (SCP) 
SCP presents crime as a bounded rational choice made by an offender who evaluates the 
opportunities for it in a given situation (Clarke 1980; Clarke and Cornish 1985).1 Thus, implicit within 
SCP is the notion of imperfect decision making by persons who weigh the overall utility – meaning 
relative costs and benefits – of crime versus others lines of action. Simply put, SCP is built on the 
 
1 The rational and bounded aspects of offenders’ decision making is discussed in detail in the “Discussion & Conclusion” 
section of this paper. 
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premise that the more rational opportunities exist for crime—i.e., the more a given situation facilitates 
a particular crime, and the greater its benefits compared to costs— the more likely are motivated 
offenders to commit crime. With this opportunity framework in mind, SCP is built on the core premise 
that opportunity plays a causal role in all types of crime—from burglary to drug dealing, robbery and 
sexual offenses (Felson & Clarke 1998; also see Welsh and Farrington 2009; Wilcox, Land, and Hunt 
2003; Wilcox, Tillyer, and Fisher 2009).  
Citing opportunity as a key causal factor in the occurrence of crime, SCP eliminates the 
traditional focus on criminal inclination and propensity in favor of concentrating on the more 
immediate physical conditions necessary for crime to occur. The focal point of SCP is on the setting in 
which crime occurs rather than on the criminal. It therefore assumes a likely offender to be a given, in 
that any individual may be an offender provided that the opportunity presents itself (Clarke 1997; 
Felson 1998). As such, SCP adheres to the principle that crime opportunities are space, time and 
situation specific, and largely generated from routine movements and activities (Clarke 1997). 
Accordingly, preventing crime requires that crime opportunities are blocked; without these 
opportunities, crime cannot occur. Opportunities and incentives to commit crime can then be reduced 
or eliminated through the manipulation of the crime setting.  
 
STRATEGIES & TECHNIQUES OF SCP 
Clarke (2009) explains that the objective of SCP is to prevent the occurrence of crime events 
by creating unfavorable circumstances in which to commit crime (also see Cornish and Clarke 2003). 
This, he argues, can be achieved by using specific strategies designed to introduce “discrete 
managerial and environmental change” that help reduce crime opportunities (Clarke 1997:2). Each 
strategy of SCP corresponds with a set of techniques. Techniques are particular actions, or behaviors, 
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deduced from a strategy of crime prevention. Said differently, strategies are theories (abstract 
perspectives) about how to behave to achieve a given outcome, whereas techniques are specific actions 
deduced from a theory (empirical predictions). According to Clarke (2009:267), there are at least five 
broad strategies of opportunity reduction strategies, each of which has its own set of techniques.2  
The first is increasing the effort required to commit crime. Techniques of this strategy include 
target hardening, controlling access to facilities, screening exits, deflecting offenders, and controlling 
tools of criminals such as weapons. In practice, this involves introducing manipulations such as 
tamper-proof packaging, electronic card access for buildings, ticketed access to parking lots and street 
closures.  
A second strategy of SCP is increasing the risks of getting caught for offenders. Technique 
wise, this may include increased guardianship and assistance for guardians, reducing anonymity, using 
place managers, and strengthening formal surveillance. Thus to increase risks, SCP suggests 
improving street lighting, requiring taxi drivers to display IDs, and introducing CCTV or burglar 
alarms.  
Reducing the rewards of crime is a third strategy of SCP. Techniques derived from this 
category include concealing or removing targets, indentifying property, disrupting markets, and 
denying rewards of crime. Examples of how to implement this strategy are the use of unmarked 
armored vehicles, women’s shelters, property marking, licensed street vendors, and graffiti removal.  
A fourth strategy of SCP is reducing the provocations that may lead to crime. This strategy’s 
techniques are represented by reducing frustrations and stressors (e.g., being polite), avoiding disputes 
(e.g., separate seating for sports teams’ fans), reducing temptation and arousal (e.g., prohibiting racist 
comments), neutralizing peer pressure (e.g., “It’s Ok to say No”), and discouraging imitation (e.g., V-
chips in televisions).  
 
2 The techniques and example described below are taken from Cornish and Clarke (2003) and Clarke (2009:267). 
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Reducing excuses to commit crime is the fifth and final strategy of SCP. Techniques grouped 
under this form of SCP are setting rules, posting instructions, alerting, assisting compliance, and 
controlling drugs and alcohol. For instance, excuses may be reduced through ethics manuals, “No 
Parking” signs, signatures for customer declarations, public lavatories, and breathalyzers in bars. 
In summary, there are different strategies—interpreted for the purposes of this paper as broad 
theories—and techniques—interpreted as specific actions—that may be used to prevent crimes. These 
include increasing the effort of and risks to offenders and also decreasing the rewards from, 
provocations to, and excuses for offending. The circumstances under which one strategy or technique 
is employed over another (or in combination with others) should depend on their costs and benefits. 
However, “the assessment must go beyond financial considerations and must include a variety of 
social and ethical costs, such as intrusiveness, unfairness, inconvenience, and discrimination” (Clarke 
2009:266). 
  
THE OFFENDERS’ PERSPECTIVE ON CRIME & PREVENTION 
 The offenders’ perspective on crime is a method premised on the belief that important 
knowledge may be obtained from communicating with and observing offenders because (1) they have 
information about crime (2) that others, including police, do not have. Also, (3) changing the 
perspective from the law enforcer to the criminal – the hunter to the hunted – provides insights into the 
nuances of theories and how they may be altered to reach greater levels of generality, specificity, and 
validity in their predictions. If these three assumptions are true then research with offenders should 
provide its own unique insights into crime commission and its control – including the preventative 
kind (Bernasco 2010; Feeney 1986; Sutherland 1937; Wright and Decker 1994, 1997). 
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THE OTHER SIDE OF PREVENTION 
 In an article that appeared in Security Management, Atlas (1991) reveals an irony of situational 
prevention techniques: they are also used by criminals to prevent law enforcement measures such as 
reports to police or arrests by them. He focuses on the theory of defensible space (Newman 1973), 
which has become a central pillar of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). As 
defined above, this type of SCP falls under the strategy of increasing the risks for offenders. 
Techniques of defensible space include manipulating the built environment in order to increase natural 
surveillance over residential spaces, and increase residents’ territorial control over an area through the 
use of real and symbolic barriers to restrict access to an area. However, Atlas (1991) noted that 
criminals may use these defensible space techniques to create a safe place for them to commit their 
crimes. “For example, criminals … survey others approaching the area … provide a communications 
network to warn dealers of approaching police, and make improvements to the environment to slow 
down police entry and prevent drug thefts” (p. 2). These physical design manipulations included 
boarded or barred windows, reinforced doors, and peepholes. Social alterations included screening for 
friendly versus adversarial visitors (e.g., through the use of peepholes) and employing spotters. In this 
way, Atlas argues offenders use defensible space techniques to their advantage as a means of creating 
their own “offensible space”. 
 Although Atlas may have been the first criminologist to note the parallels between situational 
crime prevention and the prevention techniques of offenders, he was not the first to examine how 
criminals take precautions to prevent law enforcement and victimization. For example, Sutherland’s 
(1937) The Professional Thief discusses how offenders communicate with each other to provide and 
collect prevention-oriented information. To avoid victimization and find appropriate co-offenders, 
criminals may rely on information from their counterparts. “[E]ach professional thief is known 
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personally to a large proportion of the other thieves… Any thief may be appraised by those who know 
him, in a terse phrase, such as ‘He is O.K.,’ ‘He is a no-good bastard,’ or ‘Never heard of him’” (p. 
210). Similarly, offenders discuss the best and worst methods and places for offending without being 
caught and punished. They might say, “‘Toledo is a good town,’ ‘The lunch hour is the best time to 
work that spot,’ ‘Look out for the red-haired saleslady—she is double-smart,’ ‘See Skid if you should 
get a tumble in Chicago,’ ‘Never grift on the way out”’. These “and similar mandates and injunctions 
are transmitted from thief to thief until everyone in the profession knows them” (p. 210). 
 More recent research also examines offenders’ preventative measures. Burglary is an obvious 
example of criminals weighing the relative risks of rewards (i.e., stolen items) and the risk of police 
detection or informal retaliation. One prevention technique of burglars is to break into the homes of 
associates after confirming their absence. As noted by an active burglar interviewed by Wright and 
Decker (1994), “I just try to [choose a target using] the people I know and got their phone numbers. 
‘Where you going? What you up to? You gonna leave? Who’s at the house now?’… I can find out 
where they be at” (p. 64). Another tactic of predators is to refrain from stealing items that are easily 
identifiable. Jacobs (2000:113), for example, described a case where a robber decided not to steal “an 
expensive necklace from a prior victim for fear it would ultimately identify him.”  
The drug market literature is especially rich with descriptions of prevention techniques used by 
offenders. Johnson and Natarajan’s (1995) study, for instance, explored the rational adaptations 
employed by drug dealers to counter law enforcement tactics such as crackdowns and undercover buy-
and-busts. These adaptations included looking out for and warning others about suspicious persons, 
using code, stashing drugs, splitting apart the deal maker from the money and drug holders, checking 
for marked money, not selling to addicts, moving to a different location or not selling in public, 
dressing like normal working people, not selling when police are nearby, building skills to identify 
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them, learning their routine activities, and distracting them while disposing of the contraband. These 
actions show how drug traders adapt their behavior to protect themselves from adversaries (also see 
Adler 1993; Decker and Townsend 2008; Jacobs 1996, 1999; Weisburd et al. 2006). 
 
THE OFFENDERS’ PERSPECTIVE ON SITUATIONAL PREVENTION 
Like law-abiding citizens, criminals take active steps to protect themselves and their property 
from victimizers. By definition, victimization is subjection to crime; its counterpart is offending. In 
principle, any person could be a victim or offender. It is not unusual for people to be both in the course 
of life (Lauritsen, Sampson, and Laub 1991; Sampson and Lauritsen 1990). Moreover, it is well-
known that offenders often victimize each other for reasons related to rationality (Jacobs 1999, 2000; 
Wright and Decker 1994, 1997) and because the routine activities of offenders serve to elevate their 
risk of victimization by providing more opportunities for it (Hindelang et al. 1978). In short, subjection 
to victimization is a probable cost for offenders (Jacques and Wright 2008a).3  
 Unlike law-abiding citizens, offenders also consciously act to prevent themselves and their 
property from detection and punishment by law enforcement officials. By definition, formal control is 
a governmental response to deviance (Black 1976).4 Law enforcement is acted out by governmental 
officials, or agents, including police, prosecutors, judges, and prison guards. Such persons have titles 
and roles that correspond with stages of the criminal justice process, including the detection of 
 
3 The two primary forms of victimization in drug markets are predation and retaliation (Jacques and Wright 2008b). When 
a given victimization is punishment for the victim’s wrongdoing, this is defined as retaliation (Black 1983). Victimization 
unrelated to a victim’s deviance are predatory (Cooney and Phillips 2002). There are four broad forms of criminal 
predation and retaliation: Violent victimization is subjection to aggression. Fraudulent victimization and unseen 
victimizations are, respectively, when money or other forms of wealth (e.g., drugs) are stolen from through deceit or stealth. 
Destructive victimization refers to cases where no one is hurt or stolen from but property is damaged or entirely destroyed. 
When an offender commits a crime against another offender – whether violent, fraudulent, unseen, or destructive – then, by 
definition, a victimization has occurred. These four kinds of victimization vary in both frequency and magnitude across 
people, groups, and situations.  
4 In this paper, social control is defined as “how people defined and respond to deviant behavior” (Black 1998:4). Social 
control is a vast concept. For some scientific tasks, it is empirically and theoretically useful to divide this broad concept 
into smaller parts (Jacques 2010). One typology of social control proposes there are five general forms; settlement; self-
help; negotiation; avoidance; and the absence of control – toleration (Black 1998:Ch. 5; Cooney 2009). 
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offenses and mobilization of law, the handling of crimes, and the punishment of crimes. Subjection to 
law enforcement is a probable cost for criminals (Jacobs 1996, 1999, 2010). 
For offenders, both victimizers and law enforcement officials are adversaries. Avoiding 
victimization and formal control are central concerns of all, or at least most, offenders (Jacobs 1996, 
1999). The research reviewed above clearly demonstrates that offenders take steps to stop these costs 
from being incurred.  
 
A Typology of Prevention by Offenders 
What the previously reviewed research lacks is a general, simple, and powerful classification 
scheme for organizing the various prevention techniques employed by offenders against their 
adversaries. Clarke’s (2009) notion of prevention strategies allows for that behavior to be divided and 
organized in a way that is both conceptually clear and theoretically driven. Recall that strategies are 
theories about how to behave to achieve a given outcome, and that techniques are specific actions 
deduced from a theory. According to Clarke (2009:267), there are at least five broad strategies of 
prevention, each of which has its own set of techniques. 
If we reason by analogy (see Abbott 2004), the work of Clarke (2009) suggests criminals’ 
situational prevention techniques are designed to create unfavorable circumstances for potential 
victimizers and law enforcement officials. These techniques are motivated by at least one of five 
different strategies aimed at adversaries:  
• Increase their efforts. 
• Increase their risks. 
• Reduce their rewards.  
• Reduce their provocations. 
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• Reduce their excuses. 
In the sections below, this paper draws on qualitative data obtained in interviews with drug dealers to 
show how offenders’ prevention-oriented actions are motivated by and fit within these strategic 
distinctions outlined by Clarke. 
 
METHOD & DATA 
Whereas quantitative data give a sense of theoretical significance, qualitative data are 
particularly useful for conceptual analysis and development achieved through “the in-depth description 
of cases” (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002:478) based on the “enormous amounts of information 
from their studies” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:46). A focus on conceptualization is important 
because “[i]t is pointless to seek to explain what we have not described with a reasonable degree of 
precision” (ibid.:44). Without precise concepts and explanations, the task of testing theory with 
quantitative research is difficult.  
Given that prior research on prevention by offenders lacks a well-elaborated typology for 
organizing their tactics to block adversaries, the use of qualitative data to examine the relevance of 
Clarke’s (2009) typology as one such organization scheme is the approach of the present paper. We 
will draw on detailed accounts obtained from an interview-based study of 50 un-incarcerated drug 
dealers (for details, see Jacques and Wright 2008b). Many of these persons were involved in other 
crimes as well; for example, some responded to their systemic victimization by committing retaliatory 
acts such as burglary, theft from an automobile, vandalism, and violence (see Jacques and Wright 
2008c). 
Half of the participants were middle-class and the others lower-class. At the time of the 
interview, all participants were selling drugs or had done so within two years of the interview. 
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Interviews lasted approximately an hour, were semi-structured, and conducted in an informal manner. 
The contours of each interview varied, but each addressed the pre-identified focal topics of the project. 
Regarding the focus of this paper, we asked participants questions about whether they were concerned 
about victimization or law enforcement, and whether they took any actions to prevent them from 
occurring. Note that the research was not conducted so as to understand situational crime prevention 
per se; the relevance of Clarke’s (2009) typology occurred to us only after data collection had been 
completed. Thus, the qualitative accounts used to illustrate this typology are “naïve evidence”, which 
is “arguably even superior to evidence expressly obtained to” examine a particular idea (Black, 
1995:843); a major virtue of naïve data is they are less likely to come from leading questions that 
might distort responses. 
The middle-class dealers were all white and between 18 and 23 years of age, and grew up in 
suburban Atlanta, Georgia. Each had graduated from high school, and a substantial majority of them 
were in college at the time of the interview. Drugs sold by sample members included marijuana, 
pharmaceuticals, ecstasy, cocaine, hallucinogenic mushrooms and LSD. These persons were recruited 
using a straightforward purposive sampling strategy (see Wright et al. 1992). We approached and 
asked for the cooperation of drug sellers we knew to be involved in this activity. After interviewing 
those 18 dealers, our network of direct contacts was exhausted. Therefore snowball sampling was used 
to recruit seven more middle-class drug sellers. The first 18 respondents were not compensated for 
participation, but the other 7 participants were paid $20 each; the recruiters were given $20 for each 
successful referral. 
An additional 25 interviews with drug dealers took place with drug dealers who lived in lower-
class neighborhoods in St. Louis, Missouri. These sellers were recruited through the efforts of a 
specially trained project fieldworker, known as “Smoke Dog”. Smoke Dog relied on his personal 
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connections with sellers to recruit 25 of them for the study. Interviewees were paid $50 for 
participation, and the recruiter was given $75 per successful recruit. These participants reported selling 
crack-cocaine, powder cocaine, ecstasy, heroin, and marijuana.  
It is only reasonable that a study using self-reports of criminal involvement will potentially face 
problems in terms of the data’s truthfulness. This problem was addressed by promising participants 
confidentiality and making them aware of their rights as research participants through an informed 
consent protocol. In addition, comments by participants deemed unusual or unfounded were probed 
further to reveal and resolve inconsistencies. Despite these safeguards, it is possible that the data 
gathered do not entirely reflect reality.  
The data were analyzed manually, meaning that transcripts of interviews were read and hand-
coded. The use of interviewee quotes was determined by their ability to aid in the visualization and 
conceptual development of the offenders’ perspective on situational prevention. 
 
THE OFFENDERS’ PERSPECTIVE ON PREVENTION 
The following pages describe some of the methods used by drug dealers to avoid victimization 
and law enforcement. Prior research demonstrates that drug market participants victimize each other 
and are targeted by predators such as burglars and robbers (Jacobs 2000; Wright and Decker 1994, 
1997) and retaliators who feel disrespected (Jacobs and Wright 2006; Jacques 2010). It is also clear 
that drug dealing brings a substantial risk of arrest, prosecution, and formal punishment such as 
imprisonment and asset seizure (Baumer 2008; Sevigny and Caulkins 2004). Thus, drug dealers’ high 
risk of incurring costs associated with victimization and formal punishment make them an ideal group 
in which to examine offenders’ prevention strategies and techniques.  
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INCREASE ADVERSARIES’ EFFORT 
One strategy of situational prevention is increasing the effort of adversaries. Victimizing or 
formally controlling a criminal takes effort – a cost. Thus, the more effort needed to perform these 
acts, the less they should occur. Drug dealers may recognize this and try to increase the effort required 
to victimize or enforce law. There are a number of techniques that correspond with the strategy of 
increasing adversaries’ effort. An example is target hardening by storing drugs in a locked safe or the 
trunk of a vehicle. Another is “customer filtering” by dealers. By restricting business to a select group 
of trusted customers, the effort required to set up an individual for arrest, robbery, retaliation or fraud 
is increased (also see Adler 1993; Jacobs 1996; Johnson and Natarajan 1995). 
Although lost sales are the cost of customer filtering, its utility is protection against 
victimization and law enforcement. A lower-class dealer explains how body language and gossip 
inform dealers of which customers to avoid: 
Lil’ Homie: [T]here’s a certain lot of peoples that I wouldn’t sell to… You … listen to the 
rumors…. It’s just that certain people you don’t sell to ’cause when you get the word on the 
street about babblers snitching…. [You can see something is not right by] the way he came up 
here, the way he walked up here, the way he talks. You can tell a lot about people like that. I’m 
just looking at it like, “Okay, that money would have made me fatter, but not all money… good 
because money like that might be bad.” Straight up. 
In the suburbs, “snitching” is perhaps less rampant but dealers are nevertheless cognizant and 
careful with whom they do business. To act otherwise is risky business. For example, a middle-class 
dealer described how he would handle unknown persons suspected to be victimizers or police: 
Jason: If anyone had called me, like when people called me if I didn’t really know who they 
were, they would say they got my number from somebody who knew me, then I would just 
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hang up…. I was at work one night and I had a cell phone call and this guy was like, “Hey, I’m 
a friend of John … and he gave your number and said it was cool.” I asked for his name and [I] 
had no idea who he was…, and I got a real weird feeling from it so I just hung up the phone. I 
mean at that point you just hang up. And another time a similar situation happened but I didn’t 
just hang up the phone. I was just like, “I don’t know what you’re talking about dude, sorry I 
can’t help you out ’cause I have no idea what you’re talking about.” I just kept saying that and 
he was like, “Whatever man”, and I was like, “No dude, I don’t know what you’re fucking 
talking about”, and just hung up the phone in the end. 
Interviewer: What were you worried about happening? 
Jason: I was just worried about either it was somebody that I didn’t know and that they were 
trying to pull a quick move on me, and like snake some weed from me…. Like I get out [of the 
car] to drop the bag off and like the dude when he sees it, he just grabs it and takes off. I go to 
drop him the bag and two dudes come up out of nowhere, and like choke me or something. 
Seriously, I get beat up just thinking about it. Or maybe if I agreed to meet with that person and 
I didn’t know who they were, they could be like an authority or something, you know, and at 
that point when they call you say, “I don’t know what you’re talking about”, and that would 
cover the authority thing. “I don’t know what you’re talking about, I don’t know who you are.” 
 
INCREASE ADVERSARIES’ RISKS 
A second strategy of situational prevention is increasing risks for adversaries. As the risks of 
victimizing or formally punishing an offender increase, then those behaviors should decrease. 
Therefore, drug sellers may take steps to increase adversaries’ risks. This might be accomplished 
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through lookouts, alarms, and cameras that allow for detection or identification of adversaries and, in 
turn, countermeasures to be used against them (also see Johnson and Natarajan 1995).  
The threat of retaliation is the most aggressive way to increase adversaries’ risks. Drug dealers 
use it to protect themselves from victimization and law enforcement (Black 1983; Jacobs and Wright 
2006; Jacques 2010; Jacques and Wright 2008c). Baby Girl, a lower-class seller discusses her use of 
prevention techniques – namely retaliation, stash spots, and safes – to guard against victimization: 
Baby Girl: [M]otherfucker broke into my motherfucking house to steal my shit. We were 
brutal, kicking him... [S]o they had one motherfucker looking out and the other two broke into 
my motherfucking house but they couldn’t get my shit... [I had w]rapped that shit up, put it in a 
steel wall [and] kept it hidden in there…. [A]ll you would have found was half an ounce in my 
dressing drawer but you didn’t get the big shit.  
  So we kind of...stayed back and watched and got to know who it motherfucking was... They 
went all through my motherfucker drawers... [but] they couldn’t find anything. We snuck up 
and [my friend] gave me like a “32” [revolver]. He had his shit,... We got [the lookout’s] ass 
outside, took his car, threw him in the motherfucker trunk of the car and tied him up. Snuck in 
on them two motherfuckers [inside]…. So I kind of shot the motherfuckers,… it didn’t kill 
them or nothing like that…. We grabbed the motherfuckers,... roughed them up.  
  He even found one of my safes that I had and busted the motherfucker open. They had my 
money splattered around the motherfucking house, trying to put everything in their 
motherfucking pockets. We beat their ass, I got back my ... motherfucking money.  
  We made an example of them. The motherfucking in the trunk, we kept him and made an 
example out of him for the next motherfucker. You try this shit, this is what the fuck you’ll 
get…. [W]e took everything he had and we just beat his motherfucking ass and tied his ass to a 
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motherfucking tree and told the motherfucker to go back and see his other motherfucking 
people and tell them not to fuck with us ’cause if they do this is what the fuck they gonna get. 
Interviewer: Damn. Did they ever try to do anything back at all? 
 Baby Girl: Fuck no! 
A separate issue is whether offenders threaten or use retaliation against law enforcement 
officials to prevent formal control. A prime example of such behavior comes from the present-day 
Mexican border, where hundreds of law enforcement officials have been murdered for retaliatory and 
preventative purposes (IHT 2009). There were no examples of this in the present study, but one lower-
class seller used the threat of violence against a customer to deter that person from calling the police 
and mobilizing law: 
 Pusher: One dude said, “If you don’t treat me right I’m gonna turn you into the police man. 
I’m gonna call the police.” I say, “You know what? The first time you call the police, before 
they get to where they’re going, they’re gonna pick your ass up out of the gutter of the street.” 
“What you mean by that?”, [he said]. I tell him, “I’m gonna shoot you right in your 
motherfucking back of your head as soon as you walk out that door.” He kept looking at me 
and looking at me. I said, “Don’t look at me. Look at the gun ’cause I’m gonna hit your ass as 
soon as you walk out that door.” Then he’s like, “Damn, can we talk about this?” I said, “Yeah 
we can talk about it, but if you talking about calling the police you gonna get it in the head.”… 
He said, “Ok, I ain’t gonna do it.” 
 
REDUCE ADVERSARIES’ REWARDS 
Still another strategy used by offenders to guard against victimization and law enforcement is 
reducing their rewards. If the benefits of victimizing or punishing a person are reduced then so too 
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should such occurrences. Techniques of reward reduction focus on blocking, or at least limiting, 
adversaries’ exposure to items they are motivated to obtain or people they are motivated to punish. 
Examples include hideouts, removing serial numbers from firearms, wearing gloves or masks, and 
keeping profits at the home of a non-criminal family member or friend (also see Adler 1993; Jacobs 
2010; Johnson and Natarajan 1995). 
Stash spots are one common technique used by drug dealers. These are secret places for 
keeping one’s drugs, guns, money, or another desirable object. It is advantageous for offenders to use 
stash spots because it reduces the potential rewards of victimizing or enforcing law; this is partially 
related to the increased effort required to find the item sought after. For example, a lower-class dealer 
known as Eazy hid his drugs under the porch of his home. A middle-class seller, Dave, reportedly kept 
his drugs and drug money stored in the ceiling of his bedroom; he did so by removing one panel and 
placing the items on top an adjacent one. Another such seller, Tom, sold drugs out of his car. Time on 
the road is an exposure risk because it potentially brings law enforcement officials into contact with 
dealers and their drugs. To mitigate this problem, Tom found a place in his vehicle that lowered the 
likelihood of police obtaining rewards from searches of it: 
Tom: I wasn’t necessarily concerned about getting busted from people because I had a really 
nice little space to hide my weed, and I couldn’t get busted or anything…. I had a place in my 
car, a little secret spot, like the little console has a little opening in it, you can’t really see the 
opening unless you look down below the steering wheel where the gas petals are, and if you got 
a really fat hand you can’t really fit your hand in that hole, and I have pretty skinny hands so I 
can fit it in there, and then you have to reach and pull open a flap and then pull it open yourself. 
It was pretty secure, I was never really worried about getting busted. 
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REDUCE ADVERSARIES’ PROVOCATIONS 
Reducing provocations of adversaries is a fourth kind of prevention strategy. Instead of 
reducing adversaries’ exposure to what they desire (i.e., potential rewards), the goal of provocation 
reduction is to reduce or delay adversaries’ motivations to victimize – especially as relates to 
retaliation – or apply formal control in the first place. In other words, these techniques focus on 
reducing the impetus and incitements for adversarial behavior. In the drug world, examples include not 
carrying paraphernalia, counteracting social pressure against one’s activities, and compensating a 
defrauded customer (Jacobs 1999).  
The most famous method of this kind may be criminal codes of communication (Sutherland 
1937; also see Adler 1993; Johnson and Natarjan 1995). Offenders are known to develop elaborate 
languages of their own that are difficult to understand by anyone unfamiliar with it. The lower-class 
dealer known as Shot Caller describes his own anti-law lexicon: 
Interviewer: How does a deal go down [with your suppliers]? Do you call him? I mean how 
does the whole process work? 
Shot Caller: Yeah, I call him on the cell phone. I might say, “We playing ball today?” If he 
say, “Yeah”, then that means he’s cool, he’s got the work [i.e., drugs], but if he says, “No, I’m 
gonna lie low today, gonna chill with the kids”, or something, that means it’s all bad. If I say, 
“We playing ball today?”, and he says, “Yeah, what park we gonna meet at?”, park really 
means which street we gonna meet on, or a restaurant or something we might meet at. Or we 
might meet at “the park”, [but] I ain’t going by no park for real – that’s [a local fast-food 
restaurant]. [T]hat’s just to throw motherfuckers off. If you say you gonna come to his house 
he’ll say “Meet me at the HQ”. The HQ is his spot, so there’s different shit we throw off on the 
phone ’cause the police could have the phones tapped up. 
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Whereas code is usually intended to deflect law enforcement, scales are used to reduce 
victimization. Drug traders – both customers and sellers – may have access to scales that allow them to 
know the exact amount of drugs they purchase and, implicitly, whether they have been defrauded. In 
some cases, a customer will perceive after the exchange that a rip-off has occurred. In turn, they may 
contact the dealer, complain, and perhaps threaten or commit retaliation. One way to handle such 
conflicts and to avoid retaliatory victimization is to show the customer that the rip-off did not occur. 
This is described by Phillip: 
Interviewer: Did you ever have disputes with your customers over anything? 
Phillip: Sometimes I did, when they didn’t have any scales and they’d look at the weed and 
just by looking at it they’d think it was slack or something; maybe they were really dense buds 
and so the bag overall would be smaller looking. But [there was] nothing that could never have 
been worked out with digies [i.e., digital scales]. I’d just slap it [i.e., the marijuana] on there or 
something and they’d be like, “Oh”. 
It should be noted, however, that the irony of scales is they may reduce predatory or retaliatory 
victimization while simultaneously increasing the probability of law enforcement by providing formal 
officials with a provocation for control. This is so because scales provide indirect evidence of illicit 
drug dealing and a justification for formal punishment. Therefore scales are both a liability and friend 
of guarded drug dealers. Thus, some dealers choose to forgo the use of scales in order to reduce the 
odds of law enforcement. This might be combined with other provocation-reduction techniques, like 
limiting the amount of drugs kept on their person so as to only receive a misdemeanor rather than a 
felony charge if caught. Robert, another middle-class seller, discusses some of the techniques he 
employed: 
Interviewer: What’d you do to avoid getting caught by the police? 
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Robert: [T]he only time that I was really at risk was when I had marijuana in my car and was 
driving. I’d always drive the speed limit, try to wear my seat belt, and I would try not to 
transport more than an ounce so if I did get caught I wouldn’t be charged with distributing. I 
didn’t carry scales in the car, and try not to carry a shit load of bags and stuff. 
Still another way to reduce the provocation for arrest is to reduce control agents’ opportunity to detect 
and reprimand other forms of deviance or offending. For instance, a middle-class dealer, Mark, 
explains he reduced provocations for formal control by not commit driving violations:  
Mark: I was never really big enough for the cops to really fuck with me, but if I was driving 
when I was dealing … I’d just go the speed limit, follow the rules of the road, try not to drive 
when you’re all fucked up or whatever, and I’d try to be as smart as possible .… I just did 
everything I could to make sure I didn’t put myself in a situation to get caught.  
 
 
REMOVE ADVERSARIES’ EXCUSES 
A final way offenders guard against victimization or law enforcement is to remove excuses for 
it. The intent of this strategy is to negate or counter the legitimacy or excusableness of adversarial 
behavior. In other words, the goal is to take away the justifications and neutralizations that make some 
actions possible, including the denial of responsibility or injury of the victim; condemnation of 
adversaries; or appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes and Matza 1957; also see Topalli 2005). Among drug 
dealers, techniques of this kind include not selling to intoxicated or addicted persons, giving 
instructions to customers about what to say and not to say on the phone, not allowing police to search 
one’s home without a warrant, and invoking the 5th Amendment (also see Adler, 1993).  
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A lower class-dealer known as Rollin’ describes a case where a friend of his failed to follow 
their “number one rule”: do not report your own victimization to police. The cost of asking the law for 
help is it might spark suspicion of one’s own criminal activities and hurt the possibility of retrieving 
lost items or respect: 
Interviewer: Have you ever heard of anyone from anywhere just calling the cops when they 
get robbed for 5 grand or whatever? 
Rollin’: Yeah, like somebody I know and somebody else we knew of he was messing, he got 
hit, got them all at the trap house. Dude watching all the shit, watching where he hid his shit at. 
He leave, him and the dude leave, dude drops him off and when the dude’s gone he goes back 
to the house, broke in the house and took the shit. Well he took more than the dope, he took the 
money, he took the dope and the money, the TV, the VCR. He going to make a police report. I 
said, “Why did you make a police report? You bought all that shit hot [i.e., stolen] from the 
streets? Everything you got is hot, that was stupid”. And he said I was just tripping man, saying 
“You know they stole my camcorder? My baby was born on that, my girl’s pussy!” I’m like, 
“Man are you crazy? We need to get that dope back.” You don’t call no police! That’s just my 
number one rule, me and my guys. If something happens on the streets, if a dope fiend does 
something to you or you get ripped off, we gonna go fuck that person up. Fuck the police, the 
police can’t solve anything for real. We solve it ourselves. 
This account demonstrates that offenders offer each other retaliatory support in order to increase 
compliance with the rule not to make police reports. Yet the problem with vigilantism – a way of 
increasing the risk for victimizers – is its potential to invite law enforcement against the retaliators. 
In the end, then, we can see that prevention from the offenders’ perspective is complex: a technique 
useful in one respect may be detrimental in another. For this reason, the assessment of which 
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prevention technique to use must be guided not only by its potential benefits but also its potential costs 
for both victimization and subjection to formal control (see Clarke 2009:266). 
 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
The study of offenders’ prevention techniques is a worthwhile pursuit for academic and 
practical reasons. As relates to research, it (1) provides conceptual clarity about the ways offenders 
engage in prevention of victimization and law enforcement. In doing so, it (2) increases the conceptual 
generality of Clarke’s (2009) notions of strategies and techniques of prevention. The long-term effect 
of this may be to improve SCP theory and practice. If researchers can determine the kinds of 
countermeasures used by criminals to reduce the effect of crime prevention techniques, then these 
countermeasures can themselves be countered by law-abiding persons and governments. A greater 
conceptual understanding of prevention by offenders may therefore allow for a better theory and 
practice of crime control. 
The accounts of drug dealers examined above indicate that offenders use a range of prevention-
oriented strategies and techniques to reduce opportunities for their adversaries. By increasing the 
efforts or risks of victimizers and law enforcement officials, and also by reducing their rewards, 
provocations, and excuses, adversarial behavior is reduced. Examples of these strategies include 
customer filtering, retaliation, using a stash spot or code, and developing rules of conduct. In table 1, 
we divide the 5 strategies of adversarial prevention into 20 opportunity-reducing techniques employed 
by offenders: 
--TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE-- 
This list of techniques is not exhaustive but is simply meant to illustrate that a vast array of methods 
may be used by offenders against their adversaries.  
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What are the implications of this typology of offenders’ prevention techniques for future 
criminological research? Typologies are useful insofar as they help to develop and test theories. The 
classification system presented above raises the question: What explains the prevalence and magnitude 
of prevention techniques and strategies used by offenders to block their adversaries? This broad 
question might be divided into two smaller parts: (1) How do they learn prevention techniques? (2) 
Why do or don’t they implement these techniques? The notion of bounded rationality helps to answer 
these questions. Delineating the full implications of this perspective is beyond this paper’s scope, but 
the basic thrust is as follows:  
“Bounded rationality assumes a decision-making process in which offenders weigh only a few 
aspects of a limited number of alternatives and ignore the rest” (Jacobs and Wright 2010:1741). They 
take a satisficing action that is good enough and chosen from a repertoire of “rules of thumb” or 
“judgmental heuristics” (Clarke and Cornish 1985:160). The exact information considered and the 
heuristic employed are shaped by the person’s culture, learned behavior and normative expectations, 
personality, risk sensitivity, intoxication, emotions, and immediate environment (Clarke and Cornish 
1985; Jacobs 2010; Jacobs and Wright 2010). To reduce costs associated with formal sanctions or 
victimization, offenders may – if it is deemed rational to do so – create and use preventive measures, 
thereby increasing the overall utility of offending (Johnson and Natarajan 1995).  
Bounded rationality, for example, sheds light on learning to take precautions, normal and 
deviant alike. Routine precautions are normal actions used to reduce risk, such as locking doors 
(Felson and Clarke 2010). The commonality of routine precautions among the general population 
suggests that a subset of the public – offenders – will employ these same techniques. Yet some routine 
precautions employed to avoid victimization may be ineffective in blocking law enforcement. 
Therefore offenders learn deviant precautions. Examples include the removal of serial numbers, the 
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threat of retaliation, discouraging “snitching,” using code and hideouts, not reporting victimization, 
and bribing government officials. Whether a specific routine or deviant precaution is taken depends on 
factors such as know-how, the kind of victimizer – e.g., burglar vs. robber – or law enforcement 
intervention – e.g., buy-and-bust vs. crackdowns – one is guarding against, and that precaution’s 
perceived utility as compared to other lines of action (also see Johnson and Natarajan 1995).  
Related to this is the fact that preventing victimization and law enforcement may be at odds 
with each other and backfire (Felson and Clarke 2010:116). For example, drug dealers must weigh the 
relative costs and benefits of possessing a firearm to deter robbers, because doing so may provide 
police with a reason to arrest (Watkins, Huebner, and Decker 2008). Or, hot spots policing may lead 
criminals to contemplate offending in a different area – i.e., displacement – but this might increase the 
odds of victimization by strangers or competitors (Weisburd et al. 2006). How do offenders balance 
these kinds of conflicting choices? Do they choose one option over another? Find a compromise? Or 
desist? 
As well, it should be kept in mind that situational prevention is probably more important for 
some types of offenders than it is for others. Criminals who are motivated largely by financial 
considerations, like drug dealers, might be especially cognizant of reducing “business costs” incurred 
from adversaries. Other types of offenders, such as heavily intoxicated barroom combatants, likely are 
less affected by the rational decision processes that guide situational prevention techniques.  
On a practical note, this line of inquiry is important to criminology because greater knowledge 
of offenders’ prevention techniques will make counteracting them more feasible. Offenders, 
victimizers, law-abiding citizens, and government officials are playing a “strategic game” (Goffman, 
1969, 1974; Schelling, 1960). Points are scored by and deducted from each player based on their 
abilities to outwit the other and achieve their respective goals. Knowing what one’s competitor will do 
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next and how to react need not be left to intuition or hunches; the best counter-strategies are based on 
sound scientific theory and findings. To beat offenders and victimizers in the long run, the “good 
guys” will have to learn the other team’s playbook, stay apace with changes in it, and adjust 
accordingly.  
It is paramount to recognize, however, that crime prevention techniques may reduce some 
forms of offending at the cost of increasing others. The prohibition of drugs, for instance, is intended 
to reduce drug consumption, but this appears to increase victimization and retaliation among drug 
traders (Jacobs 2000). Future research may benefit from exploring both the intended and unintended 
consequences of prevention techniques aimed at reducing offending or law enforcement.  
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Table 1. Strategies & Techniques of Situational Prevention by Offenders 
 
Increase the effort 
 
Increase the risks 
 







*Use a safe 




*Offend in groups 
*Threat of retaliation 
Conceal targets 
*Use stash spot 
*Use hideout 
Avoid disputes 
*Show customer weight when 
doing fair deal  
*Don’t report victimization 
Set rules 
*Use consistent pricing 
*Devise and explain code 
Control access  
*Don’t talk about offenses 
*Don’t give your phone # away 
Obstruct natural surveillance 
*Offend in busy areas 
*Offend in dark areas 
 
Foster Anonymity 
*Remove serial #s 
*Wear gloves/masks 
Reduce temptation/arousal 
*Don’t carry paraphernalia 
*Use code during 
communications 
Avoid compliance 
*Invoke 5th Amendment right 
*Demand Search Warrant 
Deflect adversaries 
*Don’t sell at home 
*Filter customers  
Use place managers 
*Employ lookouts 
*Create managerial hierarchy of  
co-offenders 
Disrupt adversaries 




Counteract social pressure 
*“Drugs aren’t bad.” 
*“The law is racist.” 
Assist avoidance of compliance 
*Offer retaliatory support 
*Offer legal advice 
Control tools/weapons 
*Use scale when buying 








*Commit less serious crimes 
*Keep profits at home of non-
criminal family or friend  
 
Discourage imitation 
*Brand labeling  
*Check for counterfeit $ 
 
Control intoxication 
*Avoid intoxicated offending 




Note: Adapted from Clarke (2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
